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This paper uses monthly returns from 1802-2010, daily returns from 1885-2010, and intraday returns
from 1982-2010 in the United States to show how stock volatility has changed over time. It also uses
various measures of volatility implied by option prices to infer what the market was expecting to happen
in the months following the financial crisis in late 2008. This episode was associated with historically
high levels of stock market volatility, particularly among financial sector stocks, but the market did
not expect volatility to remain high for long and it did not. This is in sharp contrast to the prolonged
periods of high volatility during the Great Depression. Similar analysis of stock volatility in the United
Kingdom and Japan reinforces the notion that the volatility seen in the 2008 crisis was relatively short-lived.
While there is a link between stock volatility and real economic activity, such as unemployment rates,
it can be misleading.
G. William Schwert
William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration
University of Rochester






"We are in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, and a lot of 
you I think are worried about your jobs, your pensions, your retirement accounts," 
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama as he opened a debate with 
Republican rival John McCain, October 7, 2008 (Reuters). 
 
1.  Introduction 
This quote has been repeated often by President Obama since that debate, and many 
commentators have called the recent recession the “Great Recession,” to reflect the size and 
significance of the economic slowdown.  Yet, at the time of the Obama-McCain debate, the 
September 2008 unemployment rate was only 6.2 percent (up from 4.7 percent a year earlier).  
Moreover, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) did not announce that a recession 
had started in January 2008 until December 1, 2008.   
So what caused candidate Obama to relate the financial crisis of 2008 to the Great 
Depression?  An obvious answer is that the volatility of stock prices, particularly among financial 
sector stocks, had spiked so high in the days before that debate that the entire country was noticing 
and worrying about the condition of US financial markets.  The implied volatility of the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 portfolio, which is calculated from the prices of put and call options traded on the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and is referred to as the VIX index, closed at an annual 
standard deviation of return of 68.01 percent on October 8, compared with just 24.72 percent on 
September 8, 2008.  The large swings in stock prices were the lead stories for most news 
organizations, usually followed by speculation about the future economic conditions in the whole 
economy.  Indeed, concerns about systemic risk, the absence of liquidity, and the stability of the 





  My goal in this paper is to review the behavior of financial volatility during the 2008 
financial crisis, to put it into historical context, to show how markets did not expect the high 
volatility to persist for long, and to show that market expectations were accurate, since volatility 
returned to more normal levels relatively quickly.  Finally, I discuss the connections between stock 
volatility and the real economy. 
2.  What Is Volatility? 
2.1  Large Percentage Changes in Prices 
  Table 1 shows the 35 largest increases and decreases in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) during its history, from 1885-2010 (34,663 days).  On September 29, 2008, the DJIA fell 
from 11,143 to 10,365, over 777 points.  This was the largest one day drop in market stock prices 
since Dow Jones began computing index numbers in 1885.  Less than a month later, on October 13, 
2008, the DJIA rose over 936 points in one day.  Not surprisingly, the popular press was focused on 
these all-time records. 
  The academic finance profession widely agrees that volatility should be measured in 
percentage changes in prices, or rates of return.  If you invest $1,000 today in a portfolio of common 
stocks, the rate of return tells you the proportional change in the value of your investment after the 
period.  A ten percent rate of return would mean an increase in value of $100 whether the DJIA was 
at 100, 1,000, or 10,000. 
  By focusing on the absolute level of the DJIA, the press and the public exaggerate the 
severity of recent volatility.  For example, the Dow Jones index reached above 778 for the first time 
on January 22, 1964, so it would have been impossible for the index to drop 777 points before that 




The DJIA fell by only 38 and 31 points on October 28 and 29, 1929, yet these second and third 
largest daily percentage drops in the history of the New York Stock Exchange, and the October 15, 
2008 drop represented only the tenth largest one day percentage drop in the history of the DJIA. 
  In the past I have suggested (only partly in jest) that the problem of volatility could be solved 
if Dow Jones (the publisher of the Wall Street Journal) would simply do what the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics does periodically with the Consumer Price Index:  rescale the index equal to 100 in some 
recent period.  Then absolute changes in the price index would approximate percentage changes, so 
the press and the public would not be fooled when the level of the index is higher than it has been in 
the past.   
  In Table 1 I highlight October 19, 1987 because it is the only day among these 70 largest 
increases and decreases that happened before 1997.  In contrast, in Table 2 I highlight the 11 days 
since 2001 that are among the 70 largest percentage increases or decrease in the DJIA.  Several 
patterns are clear from these tables.  First, there are many reversals, when large drops in stock prices 
have been followed by large increases in stock prices.  For example, the 1929 stock market crash 
represents two of the largest percentage drops in stock prices, -12.3 and -10.2 percent on October 28 
and 29.  The market rebounded on October 30 with the third largest one day percentage gain in the 
sample, 12.5 percent.  This is characteristic of an increase in stock market volatility; that is, an 
increased chance of large stock returns of either sign.  Most of the largest returns occurred during 
the Great Depression from 1929-1939.  This is a simple way to show there were high levels of stock 
market volatility. 
2.2  Standard Deviations of Returns 




statistic measures the dispersion of returns.  Financial economists find the standard deviation to be 
useful because it summarizes the probability of seeing extreme values of returns.  When the 
standard deviation is large, the chance of a large positive or negative return is large. 
  The tables and figures below show the historical behavior of stock volatility through several 
different lenses of a microscope.  At the most distant setting, we can see volatility based on monthly 
returns all the way back to 1802 in the United States.  If we want to look more closely at 
intra-month movements in stock prices, we can use daily returns that are available since 1885.  
Finally, if we want to be able to focus on intra-day movements in stock prices, we can use 15-minute 
returns that are available since 1982.  Each of these perspectives gives insights into the recent 
episodes of high volatility, yet the overall picture that emerges is quite consistent:  the 2008 
financial crisis was relatively short-lived. 
  Figure 1 shows a plot of the standard deviation of monthly returns to an index of United 
States stocks from 1802-2010.
2  Each year the 12 monthly returns are used to calculate the standard 
deviation, so there is one point per year in the plot.  This plot shows that stock return standard 
deviations are about 13 percent per year.  Since the US stock market started to include railroad and 
industrial corporations, around 1834, the volatility of returns to this aggregate stock portfolio has 
been remarkably stable, with the exception of the Great Depression, from 1929-1939, when the 
standard deviation was around 30 percent per year.  This longer-term perspective on stock market 
volatility makes it clear that the last couple of years have not been that unusual. 
  Figure 2 shows a plot of the standard deviation of monthly returns to an index of New York 
                     
2 The data from 1802-1925 are from Schwert (1990).  The data from 1926-2009 are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), representing a value-weighted portfolio of stocks from the New York 
and American Stock Exchanges, from NASDAQ, and from ARCA.  For 2010, I use the Standard & Poor’s 




Stock Exchange-listed stocks from 1885-2010.
3  Each month the daily returns are used to calculate 
the standard deviation for the month.  Since returns are not highly correlated through time, the 
standard deviation of monthly returns is about equal to the standard deviation of daily returns times 
the square root of the number of trading days in the month.  This transformation is used in figure 2. 
  There are over 1,500 standard deviation estimates in figure 2, each based on about 21 trading 
days per month.  In contrast, figure 1 contains 209 standard deviation estimates each based on 12 
months per year.  Thus, figure 2 contains much more information about volatility.  It is also clear 
that months like October 1929, October 1987, and October 2010 show up more clearly in figure 2 
because volatility was very high for brief periods of time.  Otherwise, the results in figures 1 and 2 
reinforce each other.  The typical level of the monthly standard deviation is about 4 percent.  The 
standard deviation estimates are over 8 percent from September 2008 through May 2009.  To put 
this in perspective, though, there were 10 months between April 2000 and October 2002 that also 
had standard deviations above 8 percent. 
  For recent years, it is possible to measure volatility using prices measured within the day.  
Figure 3 shows a plot of the standard deviation of daily returns to the Standard & Poor's 500 index 
from February 1983 – July 2010 based on returns measured every 15 minutes within the day.
4  
Thus, there are about 26 intraday returns used to calculate each daily standard deviation.  To 
measure the daily standard deviation, I multiply the 15 minute standard deviation by the square root 
                     
3 The data from 1802-1962 are from Schwert (1990).  The data from 1962-2009 are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), representing a value-weighted portfolio of stocks from the New York 
and American Stock Exchanges, from NASDAQ, and from ARCA.  For 2010, I use the Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 portfolio. 
 
4  The choice of a 15-minute interval for estimating the standard deviation is driven by the autocorrelation of 
shorter-interval intraday returns to the S&P index caused by non-synchronous trading of the stocks within 
the index.  Returns to the futures contract, which does not have not have this problem, are not substantially 




of 26 (a similar procedure to the one used in figures 1 and 2).  The typical level of the daily standard 
deviation is about 0.7 percent (which corresponds to about 3.2 percent per month if there are 21 
trading days per month).  The period from September 29, 2008 through the end of 2008 had 29 days 
where the daily standard deviation was larger than 3 percent, which is a large portion of the 45 such 
days over the entire 1983 – 2010 period. 
  Figure 3 also shows a plot of the standard deviation of daily returns to the near-term futures 
contract on the Standard & Poor's 500 index from April 1982 – July 2010 based on returns measured 
every 15 minutes within the day.  The futures contract returns are more volatile than the underlying 
index, especially on days of extreme volatility.  For example, on October 20, 1987, which is the 
largest in the sample, the daily standard deviation estimate is 8.7 percent for the index and 24.1 
percent for the futures contract.  This difference has become less pronounced since around 1990, as 
the rise in the trading volume of individual stocks has likely solved most of the “stale prices” 
problem inherent in the index.   
  The burst of volatility during the fall 2008 financial crisis stands out in figure 3 more than it 
does in figures 1 and 2.  Partly, this reflects the lack of intraday data before 1982, so the high 
volatility periods of 1929-39, and 1973-74 are not included in the picture.  The intraday data do 
make the October 1987 crash volatility look more dramatic than the daily or monthly data in figures 
1 and 2 show. 
  Figure 4 shows one more estimate of the volatility of the Standard & Poor’s index: the 
implied volatility of the S&P index measured from put and call prices on “at-the-money” near-term 
options of the S&P index that are traded on the CBOE.  The data from 1990-2010 are the implied 




the S&P 100 index (VXO).
5  The data from 1983-85 are from Day and Lewis (1988).  These 
volatility estimates have an average horizon of about a month into the future, and they are expressed 
as annual standard deviations of returns.  The average of these estimates is about 20 percent.  The 
post-1987 crash period is the obvious extreme episode in this series, but the 2008 crisis has the 
second largest burst of volatility.  The other periods of higher than average volatility for the S&P 
index occurred in 1990 and from 1998-2002.  
  These long historical series of stock return standard deviations help put recent events in 
perspective by showing that the general level of stock return volatility has not risen recently.  The 
contrast between the volatility since September 2008 and the prior period from 2004-2008 is partly a 
reflection of the unusually low market volatility in the period prior to the financial crisis.  
Moreover, the spikes in volatility seen in late 2008 did have historical precedents.  Compared to the 
Great Depression, though, when stock volatility rose and remained high for many years, it seems 
that stock volatility returned to more normal levels fairly quickly after the 2008 crisis. 
2.3 Forecasting  Volatility 
  Because the CBOE briefly reported information on volatility implied by longer-term options 
on the S&P index, we are able to see what the market expected to happen in the months following 
the 2008 crisis.
6  Figure 5 shows the structure of forward volatility rates implied by the VIX term 
structure on nine dates between July 2008 and June 2010.  As with forward interest rates, the 
forward volatility between any two dates can be inferred from the two volatility estimates.  For 
                     
5 http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx. 
 
6 I obtained a spreadsheet from the CBOE web site that contained the VIX term structure from the 
beginning of 1992 through June 2, 2010.  After that time, the CBOE has decided to discontinue making 
these data available.  They now have a web site that allows users to download VIX term structure estimates 




example, if you have the estimate of implied variance for the next year, 
2, and for the next two 
years, 
2, the forward volatility from the end of year one to the end of year 2 is just: 
 
2  =  [2 
2 - 
2 ]  (1) 
What is clear from figure 5 is that the market’s estimates of volatility up to three years into the future 
were not affected as much by the 2008 crisis as the shorter-term estimates three to six months into 
the future.  In November 2008, the term structure of forward volatilities was sharply 
downward-sloping, decaying from over 65% per year at the one-month horizon to about 40% at the 
ten-month horizon.  By April 2009, the entire term structure had shifted downward and become 
flatter, albeit at a level of around 35 percent, which was higher than the 25 percent level seen in July 
2008.  By April 2010, the term structure looked a lot like its June 2008 profile.  Thus, even during 
the turbulent days in fall 2008, the market did not expect stock volatility to remain high for long 
periods, as it had during the Great Depression, and this forecast turned out to be roughly accurate. 
  Another way to look at market forecasts of volatility during the 2008 crisis is to examine the 
prices of futures contracts on the VIX index that have been traded on the CBOE Futures Exchange 
since March 2004.  Figure 6 shows the futures price for the longest maturity contract from 
2004-2010.  Two things are notable in this graph: (1) the peak level of the futures price in mid- 
December 2008 never exceeds 45 percent, and (2) current levels of this futures price are similar to 
what was observed in mid-2007. 
2.4  Summary of the Evidence 
  What do these plots of stock volatility tell us?  They show that volatility measured using the 
standard deviation of rates of return has been relatively stable since the mid-19
th century in the 




show that the high levels of volatility following recent periods of market stress, such as 1987 and 
2008, have been short-lived.  These conclusions are not sensitive to whether volatility is measured 
from monthly returns, daily returns, or 15 minute returns.  Finally, futures returns are more volatile 
than stock index returns in periods when there are big price movements.  The next section of the 
paper studies the behavior of volatility in markets outside the United States, and the following 
section analyzes the volatility of different industry sectors to show the extent of the 2008 crisis in 
financial markets. 
3.  Volatility in Other Countries 
3.1  Volatility of U.K. Stock Returns 
Figure 7 shows a plot of the standard deviation of monthly returns to an index of United 
Kingdom stocks from 1802-2010.
7  Each year the 12 monthly returns are used to calculate the 
standard deviation, so there is one point per year in the plot.  This plot shows that stock return 
standard deviations are about 13 percent per year.  Some of the episodes of high volatility in the UK 
correspond to those in the US, although the magnitudes are not always equal.  For example, the 
Great Depression was associated with much higher volatility in the US.  Not surprisingly, the early 
part of World War II resulted in much higher volatility in the UK, because German bombs were 
falling on London, and the US did not enter the War until late 1941 (at which point volatility in the 
UK stock market seems to have lowered dramatically).  Similarly, the first OPEC oil crisis in 
1973-74 seems to have a much larger effect on UK stocks than on the US market.  The pattern of 
volatility since 2000 seems quite similar between the UK and the US. 
                     
7 These data are from Global Financial Data (GFD), https://www.globalfinancialdata.com.   GFD has 




  Figure 8 shows a plot of the standard deviation of monthly returns to the Financial Times All 
Shares Index (FTSE) from 1969-2010.
8  As with figure 2, each month the daily returns are used to 
calculate the standard deviation for the month.  October 2008 stands out in figure 8, along with 
October 1987, as extreme spikes in volatility.  Those months were surrounded by high volatility, at 
levels comparable with the 1973-75 OPEC period, and the 2002-2003 period.  As in the US, 
volatility has returned to more normal levels since mid-2009. 
3.2  Volatility of Japanese Stock Returns 
Figure 9 shows a plot of the standard deviation of monthly returns to an index of Japanese 
stocks from 1915-2010.
9  This plot shows that stock return standard deviations are about 15 percent 
per year.  Some of the episodes of high volatility in Japan correspond to those in the US and the UK, 
although the magnitudes are not always equal.  For obvious reasons, the period when Japan was 
reconstructed following World War II was a period of extreme volatility in Japan.  Also, the decade 
of the 1990s, when the Japanese economy was stagnant was a period of relatively high volatility.  
The increase in volatility associated with the 2008 financial crisis was similar to the behavior seen in 
the UK and the US. 
  Figure 10 shows a plot of the standard deviation of monthly returns to the Topix Index from 
1951-2010.
10  As with figures 2 and 8, October 2008 stands out in figure 10, along with October 
1987, as extreme spikes in volatility.  As in the US and the UK, volatility has returned to more 
normal levels since mid-2009. 
                     
8 These data are from Yahoo Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=%5EFTAS&ql=0. 
 
9 These data are from Global Financial Data (GFD), https://www.globalfinancialdata.com.   GFD has 
linked several series of historical stock prices to the Topix index. 




  Thus, the financial crisis had similar effects in the major stock markets around the world.  
Most importantly, the periods of very high volatility in daily stock returns were short-lived. 
4.  Volatility in Sectors of the Market 
4.1   Volatility of Technology Stocks 
  In addition to looking across countries, sometimes it is instructive to examine different 
industry sectors to understand the breadth and depth of changes in stock market volatility.  For 
example, in Schwert (2002) I found that from 1999-2001 there was a large increase in the volatility 
of portfolios of technology stocks, many of which were traded on Nasdaq.  Figure 11 shows a plot 
of the standard deviation of monthly returns to the Datastream US Technology Index from 
1973-2010.  While there is evidence that technology stocks became more volatile from September 
2008 through March 2009, the peak level of volatility was lower than for the broad market indexes 
for the US, the UK, and Japan.  The brief level of high volatility of technology returns was similar 
to what was seen frequently between 1998 and 2002, and it was of much shorter duration. 
4.2   Volatility of Financial Stocks 
  In contrast, and not surprisingly, given what is known about the source of the problems that 
led to the credit crisis in 2008, the volatility of the returns to the Datastream US Financial Index are 
much higher between July 2008 and May 2009 than at any time between 1973 and 2010, except for 
the stock market crash of October 1987.  Thus, the comparison of volatility in the technology and 
financial sectors in figures 11 and 12 highlights the substantial differences between the episodes of 
high volatility in the early 2000’s and the 2008 credit crisis. 




5.  Stock Volatility as a Leading Indicator 
The survey of the behavior of stock return volatility across different measurement intervals, 
different countries, and different industries shows that there was a large burst of volatility in 
mid-2008 that lasted for less than a year.  While the magnitude and duration of the increase in 
volatility differed somewhat, the general pattern was quite consistent.  Moreover, the relatively 
quick dissipation of the high levels of volatility was accurately anticipated by the financial markets, 
even at the time of the highest short-term volatility. 
So how does stock volatility relate to real economic activity?  Figure 13 shows the monthly 
unemployment rate in the U.S. along with the monthly volatility of stock returns (previously shown 
in Figure 2), from 1929 through 2010.
11  Several things are apparent from this graph.  First, there is 
a clear positive association between the unemployment rate and stock volatility, although the 
unemployment rate lags spikes in volatility and generally remains at high levels longer than does 
volatility.  During the Great Depression, the levels of volatility and the unemployment rate were 
strikingly similar, particularly from 1931-32 and 1937-38.  Likewise, the first OPEC oil crisis in 
1973-74 shows similar behavior of stock volatility and unemployment rates, with the latter lagging a 
bit.  In contrast, the spikes in volatility that occurred in 1987 and from 2000-2002 were not 
associated with large changes in the unemployment rate. 
Finally, and most important for understanding public reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, the 
jump in stock volatility in late 2008 was much larger than the subsequent increase in the 
unemployment rate.  Statements that the 2008 recession was the “worst since the Great 
Depression,” which were frequently repeated by public officials and the news media, were 
somewhat inaccurate or disingenuous.  For example, the unemployment rate was never higher after 
                     




September 2008 than it was between September 1982 and June 1983.  While stock volatility was 
briefly at levels similar to those seen during the Great Depression in late 2008, the unemployment 
rate was never half as high as it was during the periods of high stock volatility during the Great 
Depression. 
Of course, the reason why stock volatility can color public perceptions of economic 
conditions is that is so easily visible in real time.  The availability of financial information, 
including direct measures of volatility expectations in the form of the VIX index, provides the news 
media and politicians with ammunition for stories of imminent economic disaster.  Most measures 
of real activity, such as the unemployment rate, are only available with a substantial lag because of 
normal measurement processes. 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
The financial crisis in late 2008 was a major disruption to the financial sector.  There has 
been much discussion about the causes and consequences that led to the failure or near failure of 
many large financial institutions, and there have been many proposals to assure that a similar credit 
crisis will be less likely to happen in the future. 
One of the most visible indicators of the crisis that captured the attention of the general 
public was the extremely high level of stock return volatility.  This uncertainty prompted much 
speculation and discussion about the likely real economic consequences of the credit crisis.  This 
paper has shown that the spike in stock volatility occurred in many countries.  Volatility was 
highest among stocks in the financial sector, but it was also high market-wide. 
From the contingent claims markets there is direct evidence that market participants did not 




were realized, because stock volatility returned to much more normal levels within months.  Thus, 
the comparisons with the Great Depression that have occurred frequently over the last few years are 
exaggerated or misguided. 
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 Table 1 
The Thirty-five Largest Daily Increases and Decreases in the Dow Jones Industrial Index, 1885-2010 (T=34,683) 
 
   
DJIA  Chg  Ret 
   
DJIA  Chg  Ret 
  1  20080929  10365.45  -777.68  -6.98% 
 
20081013  9387.61  936.42  11.08% 
  2  20081015  8577.91  -733.08  -7.87% 
 
20081028  9065.12  889.35  10.88% 
  3  20010917  8920.70  -684.81  -7.13% 
 
20081113  8835.25  552.59  6.67% 
  4  20081201  8149.09  -679.95  -7.70% 
 
20000316  10630.59  499.18  4.93% 
  5  20081009  8579.19  -678.91  -7.33% 
 
20090323  7775.86  497.48  6.84% 
  6  20000414  10305.77  -617.78  -5.66% 
 
20081121  8046.42  494.13  6.54% 
  7  19971027  7161.15  -554.26  -7.18% 
 
20020724  8191.29  488.95  6.35% 
  8  20081022  8519.21  -526.00  -5.82% 
 
20080930  10850.66  485.21  4.68% 
  9  19980831  7539.07  -512.61  -6.37% 
 
20020729  8711.88  447.49  5.41% 
  10  20081007  9447.11  -508.39  -5.11% 
 
20080318  12392.66  420.41  3.51% 
  11  19871019  1738.74  -508.00  -22.61% 
 
20080311  12156.81  416.66  3.55% 
  12  20080915  10917.51  -504.48  -4.42% 
 
20081020  9265.43  413.21  4.67% 
  13  20081105  9139.27  -486.01  -5.05% 
 
20080918  11019.69  410.03  3.86% 
  14  20080917  10609.66  -449.36  -4.06% 
 
20100510  10785.14  404.71  3.90% 
  15  20081120  7552.29  -444.99  -5.56% 
 
20010405  9918.05  402.63  4.23% 
  16  20081106  8695.79  -443.48  -4.85% 
 
20081016  8979.26  401.35  4.68% 
  17  20010312  10208.25  -436.37  -4.10% 
 
20010418  10615.83  399.10  3.91% 
  18  20081119  7997.28  -427.47  -5.07% 
 
20081124  8443.39  396.97  4.93% 
  19  20070227  12216.24  -416.02  -3.29% 
 
20080401  12654.36  391.47  3.19% 
  20  20081112  8282.66  -411.30  -4.73% 
 
19980908  8020.78  380.48  4.98% 
  21  20080606  12209.81  -394.64  -3.13% 
 
20090310  6926.49  379.44  5.80% 
  22  20020719  8019.26  -390.23  -4.64% 
 
20021015  8255.68  378.28  4.80% 
  23  20070809  13270.68  -387.18  -2.83% 
 
20080919  11388.44  368.75  3.35% 
  24  20010920  8376.21  -382.92  -4.37% 
 
20010924  8603.86  368.05  4.47% 
  25  20090210  7888.88  -381.99  -4.62% 
 
20081216  8924.14  359.61  4.20% 
  26  20001012  10034.58  -379.21  -3.64% 
 
20021001  7938.79  346.86  4.57% 
  27  20100520  10068.01  -376.36  -3.60% 
 
20010516  11215.92  342.95  3.15% 
  28  20000307  9796.03  -374.47  -3.68% 
 
20001205  10898.72  338.62  3.21% 
  29  20080922  11015.69  -372.75  -3.27% 
 
19971028  7498.32  337.17  4.71% 
  30  20080205  12265.13  -370.03  -2.93% 
 
20070918  13739.39  335.97  2.51% 
  31  20081006  9955.50  -369.88  -3.58% 
 
20080805  11615.77  331.62  2.94% 
  32  20071019  13522.02  -366.94  -2.64% 
 
20071128  13289.45  331.01  2.55% 
  33  20071101  13567.87  -362.14  -2.60% 
 
19981015  8299.36  330.58  4.15% 
  34  20071107  13300.02  -360.92  -2.64% 
 
20020705  9379.50  324.53  3.58% 
  35  20000104  10997.92  -359.60  -3.17% 
 
20000315  10131.41  320.18  3.26% 
   Table 2 
The Thirty-five Largest Daily Percent Increases and Decreases in the Dow Jones Industrial Index, 1885-2009 (T=34,683) 
   
DJIA  Chg  Ret 
 
DJIA  Chg  Ret 
1  19871019  1738.74  -508.00  -22.61%  19330315  62.10  8.26  15.34% 
2  19291028  260.64  -38.33  -12.82%  19311006  99.34  12.86  14.87% 
3  19291029  230.07  -30.57  -11.73%  19291030  258.47  28.40  12.34% 
4  19291106  232.13  -25.55  -9.92%  19320921  75.16  7.67  11.36% 
5  18991218  42.69  -4.08  -8.72%  20081013  9387.61  936.42  11.08% 
6  18951220  28.77  -2.68  -8.51%  20081028  9065.12  889.35  10.88% 
7  19320812  63.11  -5.79  -8.40%  19871021  2027.85  186.84  10.15% 
8  19070314  55.84  -5.05  -8.29%  19320803  58.22  5.06  9.52% 
9  19871026  1793.93  -156.83  -8.04%  19320211  78.60  6.80  9.47% 
10  20081015  8577.91  -733.08  -7.87%  19291114  217.28  18.59  9.36% 
11  19330721  88.71  -7.55  -7.84%  19311218  80.69  6.90  9.35% 
12  19371018  125.73  -10.57  -7.75%  19320213  85.82  7.22  9.19% 
13  20081201  8149.09  -679.95  -7.70%  19320506  59.01  4.91  9.08% 
14  18930726  24.76  -1.98  -7.39%  19330419  68.31  5.66  9.03% 
15  20081009  8579.19  -678.91  -7.33%  19311008  105.79  8.47  8.70% 
16  19170201  88.52  -6.91  -7.24%  19320610  48.94  3.62  7.99% 
17  19971027  7161.15  -554.26  -7.18%  19390905  148.12  10.03  7.26% 
18  19321005  66.07  -5.09  -7.15%  19310603  130.37  8.67  7.12% 
19  20010917  8920.70  -684.81  -7.13%  19320106  76.31  5.07  7.12% 
20  19310924  107.79  -8.20  -7.07%  20090323  7775.86  497.48  6.84% 
21  19330720  96.26  -7.32  -7.07%  19321014  63.84  4.08  6.83% 
22  20080929  10365.45  -777.68  -6.98%  19070315  59.58  3.74  6.69% 
23  19140730  52.32  -3.88  -6.91%  20081113  8835.25  552.59  6.67% 
24  19891013  2569.26  -190.58  -6.91%  19310620  138.96  8.65  6.64% 
25  19880108  1911.31  -140.58  -6.85%  19330724  94.28  5.86  6.63% 
26  19291111  220.39  -16.14  -6.82%  18930727  26.40  1.64  6.63% 
27  19400514  128.27  -9.36  -6.80%  20081121  8046.42  494.13  6.54% 
28  19311005  86.48  -6.29  -6.78%  18930802  27.85  1.71  6.54% 
29  19400521  114.13  -8.30  -6.78%  19330619  95.99  5.76  6.38% 
30  19340726  85.51  -6.06  -6.62%  19010510  52.50  3.14  6.37% 
31  19550926  455.56  -31.89  -6.54%  20020724  8191.29  488.95  6.35% 
32  19980831  7539.07  -512.61  -6.37%  19320806  66.56  3.96  6.33% 
33  19291023  305.85  -20.66  -6.33%  19321110  65.54  3.87  6.28% 
34  19320531  44.74  -2.96  -6.21%  19320113  84.36  4.97  6.26% 































































































































Fig. 1 --Annualized Standard Deviations of U.S. Stock Returns



















































































































































Fig. 2 -- Standard Deviation of Monthly Stock Returns 




























































































































































Fig. 3 -- Volatility of the S&P 500 and S&P Futures, 
Based on Intraday 15-minute Returns, 1982-2010


























































































































































Fig. 4 --Annual Standard Deviation of Returns to the S&P Index Implied by CBOE 

































































Calendar Days into the Future
Fig. 5 -- Forward Structure of S&P Volatility Implied by 
Longer-term CBOE Put and Call Option Prices, 2008-2010
15-Jul-08 14-Nov-08 15-Jan-09
15-Apr-09 15-Jul-09 15-Oct-09






















































































































































































































Fig. 6 --Longest Maturity S&P Volatility Futures Value,
March 2004 - December 2010































































































































Fig. 7 --Annualized Standard Deviations of U.K. Stock Returns






























































































































Fig. 8 --Standard Deviation of Monthly FTSE Stock 




























































































































Fig. 9 --Annualized Standard Deviations of Japanese Stock Returns



































































































































































Fig. 10 --Standard Deviation of Monthly Topix Stock 
























































































































Fig. 11 --Standard Deviation of Monthly Datastream Technology Stock 
























































































































Fig. 12 --Standard Deviation of Monthly Datastream Financial Stock 




































































































































Fig. 13 -- Unemployment Rate and Standard Deviation of Monthly Stock 
Returns from Daily Returns in the Month, 1929-2010
Unemployment rate Stock volatility